Introduction
The current renewal of interest in the history of South Africa's homelands, represented by the recent conference from which this special issue is drawn, is a welcome turn in South African historiography; indeed, it is long overdue.
1 As historians seek new ways of approaching analyses of the bantustans and their related histories, circumspection and reflection on the theoretical underpinnings of such a project are imperative. 2 This paper offers some thoughts for writing new histories of the homelands. In seeking ways to approach these histories, the paper argues for deeper engagement with wider historiographies on Africa and highlights the importance of looking beyond the borders of the South African Republic (including its bantustans) in order to understand the historical dynamics of 'separate development' within 1 'Let's Talk About Bantustans' Conference, NRF Chair in 'Local Histories and Present Realities' (with History Workshop), Hofmeyr House, University of the Witwatersrand, 15 th -17 th April 2011. 2 In the historical period under discussion, the terms 'bantustan' and 'homeland' were often employed interchangeably by policy makers and administrators. However, the term 'bantustan' (meaning 'Bantu state') has been often used pejoratively by scholars and activists, with reference to the 'stans' created in the course of the partition of India in 1947 and to the Soviet satellite states. This paper follows such usage. Although the paper refrains from the use of inverted commas in making reference to 'homelands', it does not accept the logic contained in this term: that all black South Africans had homes in, or 'ethnic' connections, to such rural areas. 3 urban areas to the reserves, or homelands/ bantustans as these areas were to become known. 5 Britain's announcement of its intentions to guide the HCTs to independence was soon followed by South Africa's 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, which paved the way for the transformation of the 'native' reserves into self-governing homelands and recast colonial labour controls in national terms. According to this formulation, which had been earlier elaborated in Tomlinson's 1955 Report on the economic viability of the reserves, black residents of the Republic were to be domiciled in the ethnic homeland of their supposed 'origin' where they were to possess 'citizenship'. 6 These territories would be guided towards independence by the white South African government. 7 Like many cases of decolonisation, this bantustan project involved the devolution of control over state services and infrastructural projects, and the advancement -though more in image than in material termsof the 'national' economies of the homelands through 'border', later homeland, industrial programmes. 8 In line with policies for the promotion of self-government in ten such ethnic bantustans, between 1976 and 1981 four of these were granted independent status by South Africa (Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda, Ciskei). These states were never formally recognised on the international stage, owing to developing anti-apartheid geo-politics. 5 See for example, D. Posel, The Making of Apartheid, 1948 Apartheid, -1961 Africa, 1987) . 6 Although Hendrik Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs, rejected Tomlinson's recommendations that land purchase and major investment in the reserves were necessary for their economic viability, the principles of territorial and political segregation along ethnic lines were articulated more explicitly than ever before in this document. P. Delius Relations, 1956 ). 7 Harold Wolpe described this process as the 'modernisation' of the migrant labour system. By the midtwentieth century, reserve agriculture could no longer sustain rural subsistence to subsidise the cost of social reproduction. Tightened influx controls and political repression thus became necessary to sustain the system of cheap labour power, Wolpe argued. H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power: from segregation to apartheid', Economy and Society 1:4 (1972), pp. 425-56. The 'articulation of means of production' approach has, however, been subject to wide critique. Bridget O'Laughlin has described the 'four main points to this critique: first, that structuralist approaches reduced gender to class; second, that they minimised the importance and complexity of rural differentiation; third, that they ignored regional specificity, and fourth, that they imposed a rigid teleological model of proletarianisation. This leads to a second critique of the 'exceptionalist' argument. Literature on decolonisation in Africa has often focused on processes by which formal political power was ceded by colonial regimes to African national governments. Such accounts have understood decolonisation as referring to the actions and intents of colonial governments. John
Hargreaves, for instance, defined decolonisation as the 'measures intended eventually to terminate formal political control over colonial territories and to replace it by some new relationship.' 33 Where studies that have placed greater emphasis on the roles that Africans played in the augmentation of colonial power, the term decolonisation has been usually employed to refer to the moment of the removal of formal colonial rule and the democratisation of national politics. 34 Understood in these terms, South Africa experienced the latest decolonisation across the whole continent, with the advent of majority rule in 1994. 35 The present account finds sympathy with Marxist-inflected interpretations that highlight how bantustan policy reproduced longstanding systems of political oppression and labour control, 'modernising' a system of segregation designed to produce cheap labour by controlling the movements and urbanisation of the black population and the growing numbers of people who became 'surplus' to the needs of capitalist accumulation. 36 However, it may be argued that the frame of analysis in which decolonisation in South Africa is understood only in terms of its 'true' accession to democratic statehood in 1994 offers a limited set of possibilities for extending historical knowledge.
The concept of decolonisation just outlined presents two problems. Firstly, the linear notion of decolonisation -conceived as an endpoint or transition involving the attainment of Transkei's independence worked in the favour of these groups, by further subverting the labour and the political freedoms of the new polity's residents, the system remained nevertheless illegitimate given the 'indifference' of urban voters in the Transkei, the majority of whom failed to register and whose voices were silenced in a system that privileged rural votes and forced urban dwellers to register in rural areas.
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Innes and O'Meara, in their account of class formation in Transkei, highlighted the 'ambiguities' present in the consciousness of the proletariat in this territory, which were shaped, they argued, by the 'structure and relations of South African capitalism'. 44 They highlighted the gulf between, on the one hand, proletarians' understandings of their own oppression and, on the other, the structural conditions of capitalism and labour exploitation that lay at the root of these experiences. interests' were crucial in shaping both support for, and lack of co-operation with, ZANLA guerrillas. 63 The liberation war, Kriger has argued, may best be understood as a set of 'struggles within the struggle', a perspective that has been supported by subsequent 15 research. 64 In its disruption of established rural power structures, the war presented opportunities for oppressed groups, particularly women and the young, to make beneficial changes to their circumstances through forming strategic alliances with the guerrillas:
'[u]nmarried peasant children challenged their elders, women battled their husbands ... and the least advantaged attacked the better off', she argues. 65 In the 'enforced restructuring of rural communities' propelled by the war, established practices governing gendered and generational relations were subject to challenge. Young people, especially men, sought cooperative alliances with the guerillas in order to subvert existing power hierarchies that were dominated by male elders. 66 For young women the war presented opportunities to escape domestic drudgery and to explore new experiences with 'heroic' young men; the reordering of social space in the bush camps and protected villages allowed young women to wrest control over their own sexuality from male and female elders. 67 But while Kriger highlighted the high levels of coercion and violence underpinning the success of guerrilla mobilisation, 68 David Maxwell has argued that 'guerrillas worked out locally specific strategies to respond to the differing agendas they perceived amongst the peasantry.' These insights help to elicit new points of inquiry for the homelands: they point to the need to interrogate the limits of local power regimes, and the roles of local social relations, uneven as they were, in shaping the form, content and production of state power in its various guises. had little to do with either political passivity or naïvety. Instead, such tendencies stemmed from the ambiguous political spaces women were inclined to enter into in order to articulate their grievances and to find strategic ways of protecting their interests. 70 For example, the Catholic church, 'ostensibly conservative' as it was, offered spiritual refuge and livelihood opportunities for young women seeking escape from rural patriarchy. 71 Women chiefs, in the earliest public role to be opened to women in Lesotho, tended to act in the name of custom in order to resist the detrimental material impacts of rural 'improvement schemes' that were so unpopular among peasants. 72 In the context of male migrant absenteeism, patriarchal styles of chieftainship were gradually adapted to encompass greater consideration of women's complaints, in particular the defence of their right to brew and sell beer. The protection of women's livelihoods remained in the material interests of chiefs, lest they be burdened with the responsibility of support of the poor. In the case of the South African homelands, these formulations highlight the need to interrogate key moments that have been subsumed within highly politicised national narratives of oppression and resistance. The promotion of independent homelands has been largely seen as a process driven from above by the South African government and opportunistic homeland elites, as a political shift that protected the intensification of labour exploitation, and as one that found little popular support from below. 88 On the other hand, the 'reunification' of South Africa and the collapse of homeland administrations into national and provincial structures has been most commonly identified, it may be argued, as an outcome of successful popular struggle against the apartheid regime and its subsidiary homeland governments. The object here is not simply to refute such explanations, but to subject them to critical scrutiny. There were surely a range of uneven processes that played roles in the making -and undoing -of regimes of power and influence. These processes cannot be understood in abstract terms; rather, they are constituted in the practice of local Postcolonial African states, like South Africa's bantustans, inherited developmentalist ideologies and policies from the colonial past, and continued to be integrated in highly unequal, imperial relations that were sustained through such policy interventions. 93 The state as gatekeeper presents a useful point of departure for seeking ways to better understand the making and the meaning of bantustan states, and the specific ways that elites mobilised political support and clientage at local levels. As has been shown above, writing on the bantustans has hitherto focused on the fact of these structures of clientage, but has largely ignored the history of these and the idioms and local relations through which they were forged and practiced. 94 Did homeland regimes manage to establish localised structures of hegemony, and if so, how were these constructed-both materially and discursively? What contingent circumstances allowed bantustan state structures (however precarious and weak they may have been) to attain accommodation among some residents of the bantustans, and how were they challenged? Such points of inquiry demand that 'citizenship' -in terms of the ways that local relations were constituted around state resources -be taken seriously as an analytical problem. It may be instructive to draw connections between the homelands and other decolonising African contexts, in relation to the roles and effects of developmentalist policies pursued by late colonial and postcolonial states.
Farm dwellers and resettlement in the Ciskei
A brief discussion of research on the resettlement of farm dwellers into rural townships in the Ciskei helps to elicit some of the arguments developed above. 96 Some young men, having long been migrant wage earners, sought access to betterpaying contracts via the labour bureaux that were close to resettlement townships, where their families could reside without having to fulfil the condition of farm residence by working for the farmer. Moving the family from the farms to the resettlement areas, and thereby assuming responsibility for the care of elderly parents, represented for many migrant men the adoption of a dominant position in the household. These migrants were also able to escape some of the greatest privations of life both on the farms and upon arrival in the resettlement areas. In contrast, women and young men who had been permanent residents on farms prior to their resettlement faced constant threats of eviction from white landlords. The end of degrading, undervalued and underpaid labour on the farms was for these people posed in 96 For a full discussion of this case study see Evans, 'The Makings'.
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crucial relation to finding autonomy in the new townships. Yet while leaving the farms may have brought a sense of spatial 'liberation' from landlords and from the tight control of farm life, this nevertheless went hand in hand with the greater economic exposure that came with extrication from the 'softening' aspects of paternalism, most notably rations. 97 The resettlement of farm workers proved a crucial dynamic in the making of state institutions and their influence at a local level. As Jeff Peires has shown, in the context of the Ciskei's land consolidation programme, resettlement enabled aspirant chiefs, by claiming 'ancestral' land, to achieve territory and a base of patronage simultaneously. 98 Although the resettlement townships of Sada and Ilinge were initially administered by the BAD, the resettlement of farm dwellers proved a similarly crucial dynamic in the making of local structures of state and authority. In the context of the high demand for housing among farm workers and widespread deprivation in the resettlement areas, the state was able to forge structures of patronage and social control that deeply permeated the economy of the townships through the distribution of township housing, limited local employment and food rations through the local offices of the Department, which were adjudicated by township superintendents and known locally as the 'Trust'. 99 The creation of local employment under the administration of the Department tied resettled people into webs of rent-paying, and created the basis for new relations between local people and state institutions. Such regularised structures of dependency were both intricate and totalising. Rent payment enhanced the gendered complex of control focused on the prevention of women's permanent urbanisation. By trapping resettled women into regular employment, and deducting rent from their wages, by binding households into rent payment on a lease-to-buy basis, and by tightly regulating the payment of rent, the utilisation of state resources served to reinforce migrant labour by preventing out-migration to the cities, except through regulated channels for male labour recruitment.
These highly regulated structures were, in 1972, inherited by the new administration of the Ciskei bantustan, and became subject to new imperatives of political patronage. For the period in which the Ciskei administration in the townships was able to allocate housing plots, and to distribute basic goods and access to migrant and local work contracts, the local regime was able to foster, albeit temporarily, a limited form of legitimacy amongst former 24 farm dwellers and other marginal groups newly resident in the Ciskei. A number of farm dwellers described attitudes towards the Ciskei authorities that were rather less than hostile and were founded on a level of confidence in the Ciskei regime's delivery of housing and basic services.
In the light of similar evidence of farm dwellers' resettlement experiences in other parts of the country, it seems likely that such dynamics might be identified in other of the homelands. 100 While far from complete, this picture begins to suggest how the material conditions faced by farm dwellers and workers on commercial farmland created a set of circumstances in which resettlement opened up spaces of opportunity not only for aspirant chiefs but also for the poorest and most exploited inhabitants of the countryside who sought to find ways to better their migrant strategies. This evidence demands that we think carefully about localised processes of resource allocation, whether through personal patronage or regularised policy, in the making of power relations and state structures in the bantustans.
Evidence pointing to the gendered experiences of resettled farm dwellers', while incomplete, points to further opportunities to examine gendered dynamics in the production of power and authority at local levels in the homelands.
Conclusion
In the recent past theoretical parallels between the bantustans and African decolonisation have been understandably rejected, given the pressing agenda to condemn oppressive homeland governments and the system of racial capitalism they were invested to protect. In seeking inspiration for ways to better understand the creation of the homelands system, and in looking for tools to examine social relations and the production of power in this context, this paper has sought to connect the history of the bantustans with that of decolonisation elsewhere in Africa. Literatures on the social history of Africa, which interrogate diverse aspects of the decolonising 'moment', encourage new ways of thinking about the South African government's bantustan project, the making of these devolved state structures, the 100 The attraction of moving to bantustan townships has been cited by others. experiences of people living in the homelands and the connections of these experiences to the construction and disintegration of power regimes in the bantustans. Through a brief case study of resettlement in the Ciskei, the paper has sought to demonstrate how these approaches might be employed as part of a wider theoretical agenda to interrogate the history of the bantustans as institutions that, through the decentralisation of state resource provision and everyday practices of governance, forged new relations between state and local people with sometimes surprising outcomes. These programmes fostered a range of different responses and alliances, and produced political outcomes, that only detailed historical inquiry can elicit.
